Keynote Speakers

John Brewer

On the meaning of compromise as a social practice

Compromise is a messy concept and needs to be rescued from psychology and understood sociologically. It is normative (relating to evaluative moral standards) but not necessary a norm (something practised); it is not always perceived as virtuous (evaluated morally as �good�), nor is it everywhere a social value (a cultural belief). We begin by arguing that compromise is more than a feeling or spirit � the common way in which it is discussed; it is, we contend, a social practice. That is to say, it is an accomplished behaviour, the performance of which draws on deliberate strategies of action and forms of talk. The sociology of emotions illuminates how feelings are simultaneously enacted in behaviour and language scripts and are profoundly affected by the social relations people feeling these emotions have. There is, however, no social or genetic encoding that ties specific feelings to particular forms of action or talk since the performative behaviour involved in the social construction of emotions can encourage the disguising of feelings (acting and talking in public in ways contrary to private feelings) or pretending emotions (acting and talking in public in ways that display emotions we do not actually feel). The distinction between the public and private performance of emotions, premised on the separation of public and private space, is key to the meaning of compromise. Compromise is, we argue, the reciprocal practice of tolerance toward former protagonists in the public sphere. As such, it exists only in its performance; social practices give it meaning. However, people's capacity to begin (and continue) to practice compromise depends on their ability to maintain the public-private dichotomy. In late modernity this is a blurred binary, as the public and private increasingly interpenetrate. With respect to emotions, which have a raw intensity, urgency and impatience, it can be extremely difficult to initiate and maintain the public performance of compromise and either disguise what momentarily seem �true� feelings or pretend others. This is especially so for victims of communal violence who have experienced real or imagined harm in one or more of several ways, leaving the process of victimhood as a life-long problem to be managed. We argue that the practice of compromise by victims in the public sphere is mediated by a series of cognitive and relational variables that makes its performance easier to contemplate and enact � capacity to hope, capacity for forgiveness, capacity to transcend divided memories, beliefs about the fairness of the peace process, that its concessions are being kept reciprocally, and the nature of the dense social networks that structure victims� social connectedness in the post-conflict stage.

John D Brewer
University of Aberdeen
12 February, 2010

Helen Haste

The future and why we always fail to manage it

Social scientists consistently fail to predict the future, yet scenario-building and planning are a part of our professional role.  This paper derives from the author’s experience of engaging in scenario-building around ‘education needs in the next 25 years arising from new technology developments’ with reference to identity, community and citizenship,  as well as other future-oriented studies by the Author and others (some serious research, some more populist). It will address the main pitfalls of future-gazing and consider in particular the implications for civic education.

1. Failure to take account of likely  ‘knight’s moves’ and a tendency to predict  ‘more of the same’.  Knight’s moves are unexpected developments in technology or politics which change social practices (such as personal digital technology) or transform worldviews (such as the end of the Soviet empire or the recession).
2. Serious prediction that  current technology will change little, alongside ‘science fiction’ fantasies about technology, and that current obstacles to adoption of new tools will remain
3. Failure to consider how social practices will alter with new technology or a different political-social regime;  failure to consider structural transformation rather than minor modifications.
4. Assumption that current values will remain dominant and that worldviews will not change much. Within this, the ‘positive’ version of the future is that the general trend to liberal democracy (a current goal) will continue and many goals achieved, and the ‘negative’ version is that the forces of  illiberalism and extremism will exert pressures that will, however, be resisted.
   

Christine Liddell

Only human: Applications of psychology to the challenges of climate change

Whilst the concept of climate change first penetrated the broader public understanding of science more than a decade ago, psychology has been slow to enter the debate. There may be many sound reasons why psychologists have maintained bystander status so steadfastly in the past. However, a more participatory role is now long overdue. Insofar as climate change can be seen as having a many-faceted human element, Psychology stands above all other disciplines in the range and complexity of theoretical and practical understanding which can be brought to bear on this aspect of the debate. The talk sets out psychology's contributions to climate change past and present, and goes on to explore some of the worthwhile contributions still waiting to be made. Given the emerging implications of climate change for human wellbeing, the public understanding of risk, cultural adaptation, and the building of a global consensus for action, this paper argues that psychology is not merely instrumental to progress, but should be leading from the front � preferably with several conductor's batons.

Duncan Morrow

Revenge, Reconciliation and Resentment:  The long process towards peace in Ireland.

For almost two decades, the dominant political project in Northern Ireland has been moving from volatile conflict to stability and peace.  The process of moving from antagonism towards accommodation within the constraints of western liberal democracy has proven to be immensely long. This lecture will explore the nature of that process, the role of the various elements which made up the dynamic of peace and the degree to which revenge has conceded to reconciliation.  Finally we will assess the visible consequences to date of a peace process which is less important for its scale and scope than for the nature of the experiment and the attention that has been paid to it.

Duncan Morrow is Chief Executive of the NI Community Relations Council.  The Council has played a leading role in promoting a shared society through support of community activity, advocacy on policy ideas and convening events and people together.  Until 2002 Duncan was a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Ulster and he will bring both a practical and academic eye to his topic. 

Felicia Pratto

The Bases of Power: Why and how people struggle to use power to survive

I assert that political psychology is fundamentally concerned with how features of people, including their psychologies, cultures, societies, and histories, influence how they enact and try to control power. However, our conceptions of power can go beyond focusing on the nation-state and its people, beyond a focus on leaders and leadership, and beyond a focus on power-hungry individuals and groups. Arguably, much of the world does not live in true nation-states, yet their societies are governed, and focusing on elites and leaders ignores the agency and the power problems of most people, including the poor. I argue that humanity has a broad arsenal of ways to control power and its consequences (such as inequality), including not only governments who try to monopolize violence, but cultural ideologies, social shaming and exclusion, and socialized internal standards of ethics. I also introduce why particular types of power, including violence and healing, control of resources, social status and exclusion, and systems of obligation, arise in human life. I argue that many cultural worldviews, including moral apologies, are aimed at curtailing the problems that unfettered power can produce, but that more than one kind of cultural understanding can address this problem. I use surveys and experiments to illustrate how cultural ethics and practices influence the development of social stereotypes, social inequality, and survival rates. My aim is to invite a political psychology that considers a broader range of human experience than the governance of nation-states, cultural �difference�, and elites.